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Online	social	media	allows	individuals	to	cluster	around	common	interests	--	including	hate.	
We	show	that	tight-knit	social	clusters	interlink	to	form	resilient	‘global	hate	highways’	that	
bridge	independent	social	network	platforms,	countries,	languages	and	ideologies,	and	can	
quickly	self-repair	and	rewire.	We	provide	a	mathematical	theory	that	reveals	a	hidden	
resilience	in	the	global	axis	of	hate;	explains	a	likely	ineffectiveness	of	current	control	methods;	
and	offers	improvements.	Our	results	reveal	new	science	for	networks-of-networks	driven	by	
bipartite	dynamics,	and	should	apply	more	broadly	to	illicit	networks.	Hate	against	a	particular	community	has	been	expressed	in	one	form	or	another	for	centuries	[1,2].	Recent	hate-driven	violent	attacks	in	the	U.S.	have	targeted	the	black	community	(Jeffersontown	10/24/2018),	politicians	(nationally	10/25/2018),	the	Jewish	community	(Pittsburgh	10/26/2018),	women	(Tallahassee	11/2/2018)	and	even	perhaps	communities	of	students	(California	11/8/2018).	A	significant	recent	development	is	that	‘anti-X’	narratives	can	now	be	developed	and	expressed	through	online	social	media	[3,4].	Indeed,	online	hate	has	been	frequently	tied	to	extremism	and	violent	real-world	attacks	including	mass	shootings	[5,6,7].	Though	strict	definitions	of	hate	and	extremism	may	be	hard	to	establish,	many	groups	that	have	been	labelled	as	hate	groups	are	also	labelled	as	extremist	and	vice	versa	[7,8,9].	There	are	many	ongoing	legal	and	academic	debates	as	to	exactly	what	online	material	represents	hate,	extremism	or	a	national	security	threat	--	yet	in	practice,	social	media	companies	such	as	Facebook	are	expected	to	aggressively	eliminate	such	material	from	their	platform	in	real	time,	while	simultaneously	balancing	the	right	of	free	speech.			In	addition	to	the	difficult	ongoing	debates	concerning	content,	the	technical	task	of	tracking	online	hate	is	an	immense	challenge.	Each	day,	approximately	2.5	quintillion	bytes	of	data	are	created	by	the	3+	billion	worldwide	Internet	users	[10]	with	4	million	hours	of	content	uploaded	to	YouTube,	67,305,600	new	Instagram	posts,	and	4.3	billion	new	Facebook	messages	[11].	Each	minute,	social	media	gains	840	new	users	[12],	YouTube	users	watch	4,146,600	videos	and	Instagram	users	upload	46,740	million	posts.	Artificial	intelligence	schemes	and	Support	Vector	Machines	[13,14,15]	focused	on	finding	particular	text	strings,	can	be	thwarted	by	the	move	toward	image,	and	even	audio,	content	on	new	platforms	such	as	Instagram	and	Snapchat	where,	furthermore,	content	can	be	set	to	automatically	disappear	within	a	few	minutes.	There	is	also	the	issue	of	encryption,	with	sites	such	as	WhatsApp	and	Telegram	becoming	a	preferred	instrument.			Current	strategies	for	tackling	online	hate	etc.	tend	toward	two	ends	of	the	size	spectrum:	The	microscopic	approach	aims	at	trying	to	identify	some	overriding	‘bad’	individual(s)	within	the	vast	sea	of	online	users,	which	is	the	quintessential	needle-in-the-haystack	problem	[16].	By	contrast,	the	macroscopic	approach	is	to	simply	blanket	ban	entire	collectives	associated	with	a	particular	ideology	and	hence	face	allegations	of	stifling	free	speech,	e.g.	Facebook’s	blanket	banning	of	Ku	Klux	Klan	(KKK)	ideology	[17].	In	the	context	of	complexity	science,	the	equivalents	of	these	two	approaches	when	trying	to	understand	a	phase	transition	[18]	for	example,	are	the	microscopic	viewpoint	of	looking	for	the	‘bad’	particle	in	a	sea	of	billions	(even	though	there	isn’t	one)	or	the	macroscopic	viewpoint	that	the	entire	system	is	to	blame	(akin	to	thermodynamics).	However,	it	is	known	that	the	correct	science	lies	at	the	mesoscopic	scale,	in	the	dynamics	of	the	clusters	of	correlations	that	develop	near	the	transition	point	[18].			
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Figure	1.	The	online	hate	universe.	A:	Hate	map	indicates	current	online	universe	of	interconnected	
social	media	platforms,	e.g.	Facebook	(FB),	VKontakte	(VK).	Though	incomplete	because	of	limited	legal	
access	to	all	platforms’	data,	it	captures	schematically	the	key	features	that	we	have	observed	from	our	
analysis	of	the	empirical	data.	Hate	clusters	(e.g.	FB	and	VK	groups)	are	shown	as	larger	symbols	with	
links	between	distinct	symbols	indicating	how	different	foci	are	interconnected.	Small	black	circles	are	
users,	who	may	be	members	of	1,2,3…	hate	clusters.	The	data	reveals	the	three	types	of	inter-platform	
connection	that	emerge	but	lie	well	hidden	in	the	system:	(1)	hate-cluster	mirroring,	(2)	direct	inter-
hate-cluster	linkage	and	(3)	a	hate-cluster	implant	(see	Supplementary	Material	(SM)	for	explicit	
examples).	B:	Hate	highways	revealed	by	placing	hate-clusters	at	the	approximate	geographic	location	of	
their	activity,	e.g.	Stop	White	Genocide	located	in	South	Africa.	Links	between	hate-clusters	build	
highways	of	hate.	When	the	hate-cluster’s	focus	is	an	entire	country	or	continent,	the	geographical	center	
is	chosen.	Inset	shows	that	particularly	dense	highways	emerge	within	Europe,	between	U.K.,	Holland,	
Scandinavia	and	central	Europe.	C:	Magnified	diagram	of	the	KKK	hate-cluster	ecosystem	on	VK,	plotted	
using	the	ForceAtlas2	layout	algorithm,	which	shows	how	a	striking	‘bonding’	(akin	to	chemical	covalent	
bonding)	develops	organically	between	two	large	hate-clusters	as	a	result	of	shared	users.	Hate-cluster	
radii	are	determined	by	the	number	of	members,	which	ranges	from	a	few	to	tens	of	thousands.	We	
include	KKK	ideology	because	it	is	classified	as	hate	by	the	Anti-Defamation	League	and	
the	Southern	Poverty	Law	Center,	and	the	KKK	clusters	in	our	study	include	material	that	seems	
consistent	with	hate,	however	we	fully	acknowledge	that	their	supporters	may	not	agree.	Whether	a	
given	group	is	strictly	a	hate	philosophy,	or	simply	shows	material	with	tendencies	toward	hate,	is	not	a	
key	feature	of	our	study	or	findings.	D:	Expanded	schematic	showing	the	synapse-like	nature	of	the	
individual	hate	clusters.		
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	Figures	1-3	summarize	our	findings	of	how	online	hate	evolves	through	mesoscopic	hate-cluster	dynamics.	The	tractability	of	our	minimal	yet	generative	mathematical	model	in	Fig.	2	comes	at	the	expense	of	missing	detail,	but	can	provide	a	well-defined	and	quantifiable	starting	point	for	policy	discussions	and	‘what-if’	interventions	for	dealing	with	hate	at	the	system	level,	within	and	across	social	media	platforms,	and	from	the	local,	to	national	and	international	level.			Empirically,	our	focus	on	the	mesoscale	dynamics	(i.e.	cluster	behavior)	is	consistent	with	the	fact	that	online	group-level	hate	has	already	been	linked	to	a	number	of	recent	violent	real-world	attacks.	Examples	include	Dylann	Roof	[19]	as	well	as	the	Washington	D.C.	shooter	[20],	the	Maryland	attacker	[21],	the	attackers	in	Charlottesville	and	Parkland,	the	pipe-bomber	from	Miami,	the	anti-Semitic	attacker	in	Pittsburgh,	and	the	“incel”-inspired	attacker	in	Tallahassee	[22].	Previous	work	has	established	links	between	collective	online	material	and	eventual	real-world	terrorist	acts	[23-26]	and	also	recruiting	for	such	acts	[27-29].			Theoretically,	our	mesoscopic	description	is	consistent	with	the	fact	that	clustered	correlations	provide	the	key	to	understanding	the	dynamics	of	many-body	physical,	chemical	and	biological	systems	[18]	and	the	likely	extension	to	social	systems	[30-32].	It	also	builds	on	foundational	work	on	networks	of	networks	by	Kennett,	Stanley,	Havlin	and	co-workers	[33-35].	In	political	science	and	sociology,	it	is	consistent	with	recent	ideas	in	collective,	and	specifically	connective,	action	[36,30].	Operationally,	it	avoids	needing	access	to	any	detailed	information	about	individual	users.	Hence	it	enables	progress	to	be	made	on	this	topic	without	recourse	to	user-based	methodologies	that	are	now	curtailed	by	privacy	laws.	We	also	do	not	need	to,	and	hence	do	not,	mention	the	specific	names	of	online	clusters	(i.e.	groups	and	pages)	in	Figs.	1-3.	Instead	we	simply	indicate	two	generic	ideological	labels	in	Fig.	1.	The	accessibility	of	Twitter	data	has	made	it	very	popular	for	academic	studies	of	hate	and	extremism	[28]	as	well	as	fake	news,	polarization,	market	manipulation	and	product	promotion	[37-41].	However,	its	open	follower	structure	does	not	capture	the	tendency	of	humans	to	form	into	tight-knit	social	groups	of	like-minded	individuals,	within	which	group	members	can	develop	thoughts	and	plans	freely	without	restrictions	on	length	of	content	[42]	and	without	running	significant	risk	of	being	trolled	or	of	encountering	opposing	opinions.	At	the	other	end	of	the	spectrum	are	platforms	like	Telegram,	that	favor	privacy	for	within-group	interactions.	But	this	privacy	comes	at	the	cost	of	making	it	difficult	for	the	groups	to	broadcast	to	and	attract	potential	new	members.	A	middle	point	is	offered	by	social	media	platforms	like	Facebook	and	its	counterparts	such	as	VKontakte,	which	is	based	in	Russia	and	has	>0.5	billion	users	worldwide.	These	platforms	allow	collective	accounts	(e.g.		“Groups”	in	FB	and	VK,	“Community	Pages”	in	FB,	and	“Public	Pages”	in	VK)	where	individual	users	can	coalesce	into	groups	[43,44].	Each	group	is	a	unique,	well-defined,	tight-knit	cluster	of	users	with	its	own	URL,	name	and	member	list;	its	own	group	administrators	who	are	themselves	group	members;	and	its	own	group	focus	which	can	then	attract	new	recruits.	Moreover,	group	members	are	able	to	collectively	self-police	other	members	and	report	unwanted	behavior	(e.g.	trolling,	adverse	opinions)	to	group	administrators	who	can	act	promptly	to	remove	the	relevant	users	–	and	group	administrators	can	vet	potential	new	members.	Bots	can	be	detected	through	the	frequent	interactions	between	group	members	and	eliminated	immediately	by	the	in-group	administrators.		The	importance	of	these	online	groups	in	influencing	people’s	real-world	actions	has	been	demonstrated	recently	in	a	number	of	settings,	e.g.	stay-at-home-dads	(SAHD),	anti-vaccinations,	anti-pregnancy,	and	alternative	medications	for	treating	cancer	[45-48].	Groups	provide	a	means	for	developing	narratives,	support,	funding	and	recruitment,	and	do	so	in	a	way	that	feels	safer	and	more	intimate	to	their	users	[49].	Indeed,	encouraging	group	formation	and	function	by	adding	additional	
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tools	for	group	administrators	and	members,	was	recently	announced	as	a	primary	mission	of	Facebook	and	is	likewise	being	copied	by	other	social	media	companies	[50].	However,	just	as	these	powers	can	protect	innocuous	groups	from	harm,	they	can	also	protect	groups	focused	on	hate.	This	can	make	joining	such	a	group	that	promotes	hate	attractive	since	it	significantly	reduces	the	risks	of	being	trolled	or	being	confronted	by	opponents.	Even	on	platforms	that	do	not	formally	have	groups,	quasi-groups	can	now	be	formed:	on	Telegram	these	are	in	the	form	of	groups	and	super-groups	[28,51].	Hence	our	analysis	of	cluster	dynamics	is	likely	applicable	to	all	other	present,	and	future,	social	media	platforms.	Telegram	also	allows	the	formation	of	pods	that	can	then	feed	into	Instagram	[52],	and	also	Snapchat	[53].	Importantly,	the	latter	two	platforms	are	likely	the	most	relevant	for	younger	generations	who	tend	not	to	use	Facebook	[54].	Even	though	groups	can	formally	be	open	(i.e.	everyone	sees	members	and	content),	closed	(i.e.	see	members	but	not	all	detailed	content),	or	secret	(i.e.	like	closed	but	cannot	be	searched),	most	are	open	since	they	aim	to	attract	new	support	with	the	hope	that	they	remain	hidden	by	the	sea	of	online	activity.		We	focus	here	on	such	groups	on	Facebook	and	VKontakte,	as	well	as	“community/public”	pages	which	are	effectively	a	weaker	form	of	group	structure.	Our	snowballing	methodology	is	the	same	as	in	our	earlier	work	on	pro-ISIS	online	activity	[29,55-57]	(SM).	Groups	and	pages	both	allow	humans	to	cluster,	and	for	simplicity	are	both	referred	to	here	as	clusters.	At	no	stage	do	we	need	to	enquire	about	the	real	identities	or	personal	information	of	the	users,	just	as	understanding	how	water	boils	only	requires	a	description	of	clusters	of	correlated	molecules	[18].	Instead,	our	analysis	is	confined	to	the	mesoscale	cluster	dynamics	that	are	freely	visible	on	these	platforms.	Our	study	also	serves	to	shed	light	on	the	online	world	that	potentially	vulnerable	individuals,	including	minors,	will	experience	and	absorb	when	they	happen	to	hit	upon	one	of	these	groups	and	then	follow	its	links.		Figure	1A	shows	an	illustrative	portion	of	the	global	wiring-diagram	of	hate	clusters	for	a	representative	recent	day	(October	1,	2018).	Our	results	in	this	paper	focus	on	the	largest	clusters	around	topics	of	neo-Nazi	white	supremacy,	anti-Semitic,	anti-Muslim,	anti-LBGQT	etc.,	however	a	full	map	should	eventually	be	developed	to	include	all	forms	of	hate	and	all	platforms.	Starting	with	a	given	hate	cluster	A,	we	look	outward	to	find	any	cluster	B	to	which	cluster	A	is	explicitly	and	strongly	connected,	as	opposed	to	simply	having	a	few	common	members.	We	also	developed	software	to	perform	this	process	automatically	and,	upon	cross-checking	the	findings	with	our	manual	list,	we	were	able	to	obtain	approximately	90%	consistency	between	the	manual	and	automated	versions.	We	iterated	this	process	until	closure	of	the	list	(i.e.	the	search	led	back	to	clusters	that	were	already	in	the	list)	on	a	daily	basis	in	real	time,	yielding	a	few	hundred	hate	clusters.	Highways	exist	between	hate	clusters	across	platforms,	countries,	languages	and	particular	ideologies	(Fig.	1B).	Instead	of	hate	residing	in	‘corners’	of	the	online	social	media	world,	we	find	that	it	favors	a	high-dimensional	structure	that	crosses	boundaries	of	physical	platform,	geographic	location,	nationality,	language	and	particular	ideology	(Figs.	1A	and	3).	For	example,	neo-Nazi	clusters	associated	with	English	football,	mix	white	supremacist	skinhead	imagery	while	promoting	Black	music	genres.	This	eclectic	and	internally	contradictory	mix	of	themes	makes	the	global	web	of	hate	like	an	all-encompassing	fly-trap	that	can	quickly	capture	new	recruits	without	them	yet	having	a	clear	focus	for	their	hate.		The	resulting	global	hate	network	(Fig.	1A)	represents	a	novel	example	of	a	large-scale,	temporal	
bipartite	network-of-networks	whose	complex	structure	evolves	dynamically	over	time	as	a	result	of	the	ongoing	interplay	between	(1)	the	addition	of	connections	from	individual	users	(black	dots)	into	a	given	hate	cluster	(larger	colored	shapes)	when	the	users	join	that	cluster,	or	the	removal	of	links	when	the	users	leave;	(2)	the	addition	of	links	between	individual	hate	clusters	when	they	link	to	each	other;	(3)	the	addition	or	removal	of	connections	between	platforms.	Even	though	platforms	such	as	Facebook	and	VKontakte	are	operationally	and	financially	independent	social	media	networks	--	and	likewise	the	clusters	within	each	platform	are	nominally	independent	in	that	they	can	have	different	
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administrators	and	members,	names	and	locations	–	we	observe	three	different	types	of	robust	inter-platform	connections	(see	Fig.	1A	and	caption,	with	specific	examples	in	the	SM).		We	also	observe	a	remarkable	adaptation	strategy	across	platforms,	in	which	a	banned	ideology	on	platform	A	first	migrates	to	platform	B	–	and	then	when	chased	from	platform	B,	reappears	at	a	later	state	on	platform	A,	where	it	is	still	banned,	but	now	in	a	‘reincarnated’	form	that	is	harder	to	catch.	Figure	1A	shows	the	specific	example	of	the	Ku	Klux	Klan	ideology,	which	became	banned	from	Facebook	and	instead	evolved	an	ecology	of	clusters	(nearly	60)	on	VKontakte.	These	included	some	Ukranians	as	cluster	members:	When	Russia	invaded	Ukraine	and	VKontakte	became	banned	[58]	this	ecosystem	migrated	back	to	Facebook	but	profited	from	using	titles	in	Cyrillic	which	made	them	likely	harder	to	catch	by	platform	A’s	machine-learning	detection	algorithms.	Figure	2	presents	a	mathematical	theory	for	exploring	the	combined	impact	on	the	global	online	hate	universe	of	different	platforms	separately	trying	to	remove	hate	content.	It	considers	hate	clusters	and	their	members	in	one	platform	(e.g.	platform	1)	incurring	a	cost	R	to	access	another	platform	(e.g.	platform	2).	This	cost	R	mimics	their	risk	of	exposure	and	hence	potential	sanctions	in	the	form	of	suspension	of	users’	accounts	or	possible	legal	action.	For	concreteness,	we	consider	the	common	situation	that	we	find	in	the	empirical	data,	of	a	subset	(1b)	of	c	hate	clusters	on	a	given	social	media	platform	forming	a	loop.	While	each	hate	cluster	may	have	links	to	other	clusters	outside	the	subset,	we	find	that	these	invariably	lead	down	a	rabbit-hole,	and	hence	do	not	form	additional	simple	loops.	We	choose	the	schematic	of	Fig.	2A	which	is	a	simplification	of	Fig.	1A,	however	we	stress	that	our	theory	can	be	applied	to	any	loop-like	arrangement	of	clusters,	any	form	of	cost	function	R,	and	any	arrangement	of	social	media	platforms.	Building	on	the	mathematics	of	Ref.	59	and	in	the	SM,	and	assuming	a	simple	probability	q	of	a	given	hate	cluster	making	a	link	to	another	platform,	we	can	derive	a	formula	for	the	path-length	l	of	the	highway	(i.e.	shortest	path)	between	any	two	hate	clusters	in	subset	1b	on	platform	1.	The	resulting	formula	for	the	average	value	of	the	shortest	path	(i.e.	length	of	hate	highway)	between	any	two	hate	clusters	in	Fig.	2A,	and	hence	also	in	Fig.	1A,	is	then	given	by			
		(1)		This	same	formula	applies	for	any	number	c	of	hate	clusters	and	any	cost	R.	Apart	from	an	unimportant	scaling	factor,	it	also	applies	even	if	the	strength	of	support	between	clusters	A	and	B,	B	and	C	etc.	is	highly	asymmetric.	Though	R	is	in	principle	general,	we	consider	here	the	cost	R	increasing	linearly	with	the	number	of	links	between	the	two	platforms,	which	is	consistent	with	the	idea	that	more	links	between	platforms	1	and	2	will	make	platform	1	more	noticeable	to	platform	2’s	managers	and	law	enforcement.	Figure	2B	shows	that	the	average	shortest	path	in	Eq.	1	as	a	function	of	the	number	of	links	between	platform	1	and	2,	then	has	a	minimum	--	and	gives	approximate	expressions	for	this	minimum	as	obtained	from	Eq.	1.			
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Figure	2:	Mathematical	theory	of	multi-platform	hate	highways.	A:	Establishing	links	(as	observed	
empirically,	see	Fig.	1A)	from	a	platform	like	VK	(1b)	to	a	better-policed	platform	like	FB	(2)	runs	the	
risk	(cost	R)	of	being	noticed	by	FB	moderators,	and	hence	sanctions	and	possibly	even	legal	action.	Since	
more	links	creates	more	risk,	we	choose	R	as	proportional	to	the	number	of	links	with	k	being	a	constant	
of	proportionality.	B:	Theory	shows	that	counterintuitively,	the	diligent	action	of	moderators	on	platform	
2	(e.g.	FB)	in	reducing	the	number	of	inter-platform	links	r,	unwittingly	reduces	the	shortest	path	
between	clusters	in	platform	1b,	hence	making	the	hate	highways	between	clusters	in	1b	stronger	and	
more	efficient	(as	measured	by	the	shortest	path	length,	which	in	turn	is	relevant	for	sharing	hate	
material	and	messaging).	Though	we	choose	panel	A	here	to	resemble	Fig.	1A,	the	same	theory	(and	
hence	Eq.	1,	derived	in	the	SM)	applies	to	any	of	the	loop-like	arrangements	of	clusters	that	are	
commonly	observed	in	the	data	(see	SM	for	empirical	example).	C:	As	the	universe	of	social	media	
expands	in	the	future	to	many	interconnected	platforms,	our	theory	predicts	that	the	combined	effect	of	
having	diligent	yet	independent	moderators	on	each	platform	will	create	spontaneous	dark	pools	within	
which	there	are	superhighways	of	hate.	A	formidable	adversary	can	then	form	within	these	dark	pools,	
and	can	subsequently	launch	a	strong	attack	on	other	platforms	(e.g.	FB).	The	theory	also	predicts	that	by	
coordinating	moderators’	actions	across	platforms,	the	corresponding	costs	R	(See	Eq.	2)	can	be	chosen	
in	a	coordinated	way	to	significantly	reduce	the	likelihood	of	this	undesirable	outcome.		
		
reducing links between 
platforms (e.g. #1b and #2) makes 
hate highways more efficient
i.e. smaller average path length
between hate clusters
B
A
C social media platformsN >> 1
>
cost of new inter-platform link
# existing links between platforms
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The	counterintuitive	policy	implication	of	our	mathematical	theory,	and	hence	Fig.	2B,	is	that	a	seemingly	sensible	approach	by	a	moderator	on	platform	2	to	decrease	the	number	of	links	between	platforms	1	and	2,	can	actually	lead	to	an	increase	in	the	hate	highway	efficiency	within	platform	1	(i.e.	decreased	distance	between	any	two	hate	clusters	in	platform	1)	which	in	turn	generates	a	stronger	community	of	hate	on	platform	1	–	and	hence	ultimately	generates	a	more	potent	threat	facing	platform	2.	Employing	renormalization,	Eq.	(1)	can	be	generalized	to	describe	loops-of-loops	and	hence	applied	across	different	levels	of	structure	within	and	between	platforms.	The	length	of	the	highway	between	any	two	hate	clusters	given	the	full	hate	universe	in	Fig.	1A	with	i=1,2,..N	platforms,	then	becomes:		
	
		(2)		It	can	be	shown	mathematically	(see	SM)	that	a	gradual,	monotonic	change	in	the	cost	parameter	R	can	now	lead	to	an	abrupt	change	in	the	functional	behavior	of	the	online	hate	universe,	with	hate	highways	abruptly	re-routing	to	bypass	unwilling	platforms,	and	potentially	strengthening	their	existing	inter-cluster	links	in	the	process.	This	will	unfortunately	create	sudden,	out-of-the-blue	surprises	for	hate	moderators	at	the	global	level.	In	addition,	in	an	online	universe	with	many	social	media	platforms	(Fig.	1A),	Eq.	2	identifies	a	hidden	resilience	in	the	global	axis	of	hate	as	illustrated	in	Fig.	2C,	whereby	hate	clusters	in	a	given	platform	1	can	spontaneously	and	rather	abruptly	emerge	as	a	‘dark	pool’	(1b).	This	dark	pool	retains	links	to	other	hate	clusters	in	platform	1	and	to	platform	2	but	these	are	not	used,	hence	monitoring	of	platform	1	from	platform	2	gives	the	false	impression	that	platform	1	is	innocuous	–	and	similarly	for	any	monitoring	of	subnetwork	1b	from	within	the	rest	of	platform	1.	This	hidden	resilience	offers	an	explanation	as	to	why	current	control	methods	of	banning	an	entire	sector	of	clusters	on	a	given	platform,	are	likely	to	be	ineffective.	Fortunately,	Eq.	2	also	predicts	that	by	coordinating	moderators’	actions	across	platforms,	the	corresponding	costs	R	can	be	chosen	in	a	coordinated	way	to	avoid	this	undesirable	outcome.			Figure	3	reveals	a	remarkable	bottom-up	rewiring	and	repair	capability	that	lies	hidden	in	the	online	hate	ecosystem	at	finer	resolutions,	as	revealed	by	its	response	following	the	2018	Parkland	school	shooting.	While	we	know	of	no	evidence	that	KKK	was	involved	in	this,	it	is	known	that	accusations	and	conspiracies	did	circulate	in	the	days	following	the	attack,	and	Fig.	3A	shows	specifically	how	the	KKK	clusters	on	VKontakte	responded.	In	particular,	links	akin	to	chemical	‘bonds’	form	between	previously	unconnected	KKK	clusters.	We	speculate	that	this	is	an	adaptive	evolutionary	response	by	which	the	decentralized	KKK	ideological	organism	manages	to	come	together	to	protect	itself	by	bringing	together	previously	unconnected	supporters	in	a	collective	way.	The	remarkable	aspect	is	that	this	appears	to	happen	in	a	bottom-up,	organic	way,	increasing	the	cluster-projected	network	clustering,	degree	and	hence	togetherness	(Fig.	3B).	Figure	3C	shows	the	network	on	a	larger	scale	around	February	17,	with	the	bonding	density	of	common	users	clearly	visible	(white	cloud	between	the	green	clusters).	Interestingly,	similar	bonding	is	also	seen	in	the	response	of	anti-Western	jihadi	hate	groups	during	2015	[60]	when	the	leader	of	ISIS	was	reportedly	injured	in	an	air	strike	(Fig.	3D),	which	leads	us	to	speculate	that	the	‘covalent	bonding’	is	a	general	feature.	Also	noteworthy	is	the	fact	that	this	dynamical	KKK	bonding	conserves	the	distribution	of	KKK	group	sizes	over	time,	with	each	day	producing	a	similar	distribution	to	Fig.	3E	(left	panel).	The	approximate	power-law	has	a	high	
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goodness-of-fit	p=0.92	and	the	power-law	exponent	1.7	is	consistent	with	our	data	collection	process	of	extracting	cluster	sizes	from	across	the	different	KKK	cluster	ecologies	on	VKontakte	(see	SM).	Specifically,	the	SM	shows	mathematically	and	using	simulation	that	aggregating	data	from	a	set	of	distinct	power-law	distributions	having	exponents	near	2.5,	as	expected	based	on	previous	studies	of	jihadi	online	groups	[29],	yields	an	approximate	power-law	with	exponents	in	the	range	1.7-1.9,	as	we	indeed	observe	in	the	empirical	data	(Figs.	3E,F).			
	
Figure	3.	Online	hate	cluster	ecosystem	rewiring	and	self-repair.	A:	KKK	ecosystem	on	VKontakte	prior	to	
and	after	the	February	14,	2018	Parkland	school	shooting.	During	the	subsequent	week,	the	organic	
rewiring	served	to	create	a	‘bond’	between	previously	distinct	KKK	clusters.	Such	a	need	to	pull	together,	
coincides	with	a	period	of	uncertainty	for	the	KKK	that	was	generated	by	conspiracy	theories	about	
culpability.	For	clarity,	only	users	(white	circles)	that	change	their	status	in	the	next	timestep	are	shown.	
Larger	red	nodes	are	clusters	that	are	closed	(i.e.	closed	VK	groups),	green	nodes	are	open	(i.e.	open	VK	
groups).	Yellow	links	mean	the	user	will	leave	the	cluster	between	day	t	and	day	t+1,	meaning	that	link	is	
going	to	disappear.	The	blue	links	mean	the	user	joins	the	group	on	day	t.	B:	This	pulling-together	is	
confirmed	by	network	measures	for	the	KKK	cluster	network.	C:	Full	KKK	network	snapshot	1	week	after	
Parkland	shooting,	confirms	the	establishment	of	a	‘bond’	between	the	largest	KKK	clusters	that	did	not	
exist	before.	D:	A	remarkably	similar	‘bonding’	effect	arises	in	the	jihadi	hate	cluster	ecology	associated	
with	pro-ISIS	support,	around	March	18,	2015	a	few	days	after	a	coalition	strike	appears	to	have	
wounded	ISIS	leader	Abu	Bakr	al-Baghdadi.	Rumors	immediately	circulated	among	the	clusters	that	top	
ISIS	leaders	were	meeting	to	discuss	who	would	replace	him	if	he	died,	suggesting	that	his	injuries	were	
Group-projected 
network measures (left)
User-projected
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(right)!" ~2.5
→ ( = 1.7 − 1.9
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serious.	However,	none	of	this	become	public	knowledge	in	the	media,	i.e.	the	rewiring	and	self-repair	
leading	to	conversion	of	two	clusters	into	one	(i.e.	two	disappeared,	shown	yellow,	and	one	appeared,	
shown	as	blue)	indeed	appears	to	be	bottom-up,	organic.	While	C	mimics	electronic	covalent	bonding,	D	
is	a	more	extreme	version	of	bonding	akin	to	nuclear	fusion.	E:	Both	the	KKK	ecology	and	the	ecology	of	
illicit	financial	activities,	show	support	for	a	power-law	distribution	with	exponents	between	1.7	–	1.9	
and	high	goodness-of-fit	p-values	[61].	F:	This	range	of	power-law	exponents	in	E	is	consistent	with	
aggregating	data	from	different	thematic	subsystems,	each	of	which	has	power-law	distribution	with	
exponent	broadly	distributed	around	2.5	as	found	earlier	in	Ref.	29.	See	SM	for	full	analysis.			In	addition	to	highlighting	the	need	to	coordinate	moderation	across	platforms	in	order	to	avoid	creating	hate	dark	pools	(Fig.	2C),	our	findings	suggest	that	platforms	can	benefit	by	avoiding	white-label	banning	(e.g.	KKK	in	Fig.	1A)	and	instead	look	to	influence	the	‘bond’	dynamics	that	arise	following	particular	real-world	events	(Figs.	3A-D).	There	are	of	course	many	limitations	of	our	study,	most	notably	that	we	do	not	yet	have	a	complete	online	map	(Fig.	1A)	due	to	the	current	lack	of	access	to	platform	data	that	faces	both	researchers	and	government	agencies	[62].	Despite	their	incompleteness,	we	believe	our	findings	can	nonetheless	also	shed	light	on	other	illicit	networks	which	operate	under	similar	pressures,	i.e.	networks	that	are	simultaneously	open	enough	to	find	new	recruits/victims	and	yet	sufficiently	hidden	that	they	can	avoid	capture.	Using	recent	data	obtained	from	online	clusters	pursuing	financial	fraud	[63]	we	indeed	find	preliminary	quantitative	similarities:	e.g.	the	distribution	of	cluster	sizes	is	again	an	approximate	power-law	with	exponent	in	the	range	1.7-1.9	(Figs.	3E	and	F).					
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